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SOMETHING SPECIAL IN THE FARES?
REGULATING COMMERCIAL AIRLINE
ADVERTISING
AMY NICOL MARLOWE

I.

INTRODUCTION

A IRLINE ADVERTISEMENTS quoting airfares, such as
I American Airline's "London $239,'" are published in
newspapers across the country daily. 2 These fare advertisements were the source of protracted litigation involving as many as thirteen airlines, thirty-four states and,
although not a party, the Department of Transportation
(DOT).' The central issue of the litigation was purely juI

American Airlines, Inc., Advertisement, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 4, 1991,
at 21A [hereinafter American Ad].
2 Douglas W. Nelms, Sending The Right Signal: Airline Advertising, AIR TRANSPORT
WORLD, Feb. 1991, at 2. Airlines pour millions of dollars into national advertisements of special low fares, tour packages and special membership privileges, such
as frequent flier promotions. Id. A survey by ADVERTISING AGE MAGAZINE revealed that the top nine airlines spent $489.2 million on national advertising:
$290.4 million on print advertising, $188.7 million on radio and television advertisements, and $7.1 million on billboard and poster advertisements in 1989.
These estimates are much lower than those reported by the airlines as the airlines'
reports include a broader range of promotions. Id.
3 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992) [hereinafter
Morales IV]. This Comment will refer to the various determinations of the
Supreme Court during the Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. litigation, including
the Court's opinion, Morales IV, by number chronologically. See also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 773
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 307 (1990); Kansas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
730 F. Supp. 366 (D. Kan. 1990); New York v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F.
Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); California v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 720 F. Supp.
826 (S.D. Cal. 1989); People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal.
1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985).
The DOT kept a relatively low profile throughout the litigation and allowed
"the airlines to take the initiative in the court battles." Bill Poling, Texas Attorney
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risdictional, involving the roles of the federal government
and state governments in regulating airline advertising.'
The litigation arose, however, due to a dispute over
whether certain common airline advertising practices are
misleading to consumers.
Many state and local governments contend that certain
popular airfare advertisements are misleading. 5 Take, for
example, the $239 fare to London advertised by American
Airlines. 6 The actual price of the advertised airline ticket
is more than double the $239 quoted. First, the airline
does not offer a discounted price for a one-way ticket but,
instead, requires a round-trip ticket purchase before the
consumer can obtain the advertised one-way fare.7 The
ticket, then, is $478. The price becomes $506 upon the
addition of applicable customs and immigration fees and
an international departure tax.8 A round-trip ticket to
London for $506 might still seem quite reasonable. The
traveler, however, must depart on certain limited days of
GeneralAppeals Supreme Court Over Air Ads, TRAVEL WKLY, Oct. 8, 1990, at 99. This
posture was in the interest of "avoiding a direct confrontation with state governments," reflecting the Bush administration's, like the Reagan administration's,
policy of federalism. Id. The Bush administration, however, was deeply involved
in the litigation. The Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief in
response to the appeal of Texas Attorney General Dan Morales. Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2794 (1991) [hereinafter Morales I]. The Solicitor
General responded by recommending that the Supreme Court not consider the
issue. The Court, nevertheless, decided to take up the case, granting Morales'
petition for writ of certiorari in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 632
(1991) [hereinafter Morales II]. The Solicitor General later submitted a motion to
participate in oral argument as amicus curiae, which the Supreme Court granted.
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 962 (1992) [hereinafter Morales
II].
4 Morales IV, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992). The sole issue in the litigation was
whether federal law preempts state regulation of airline advertising. Id. at 2034.
5 Consumer interest groups have also labelled other airline advertising practices misleading. These include representing flights as "direct when they involve
a change of aircraft" and misleading representations about an airline's "on-time
performance." Bill Poling, American Asks DOT to Outlaw Misleading International
Flight Listing, TRAVEL WKLY, May 27, 1991, at 1; Notice of Enforcement Proceeding & Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, Dep't of Transp., Dkt. 47830, Nov.
8, 1991.
6 American Ad, supra note 1, at 21A.
7 Id.
8 Id. "Other taxes and surcharges may [also] apply, based on destination." Id.
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the week and must stay in London for a certain number of
days to obtain the discounted price. 9 Consumers,
through their state and local governments and consumer
protection organizations, contend that such a fare advertisement is misleading and should be subject to regulations that would require a more accurate and clear
portrayal of the actual fare.1°
Currently, the DOT exercises exclusive authority to impose regulations in order to protect consumers from misleading airline advertisements."t The DOT maintains that
such advertisements are not misleading and that any addi-2
tional regulation of airfare advertising is unnecessary.
The DOT's characterization of necessary regulation in the3
area of airfare advertising, however, is highly disputed.'
The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)
has been the most active in contesting the DOT's regulatory policy. Dissatisfied with the substance of the DOT's
regulation of airline advertising and the DOT's enforcement efforts, the attorneys general of several states have
taken steps pursuant to their own more comprehensive
consumer protection laws to stop airline advertising practices not addressed by federal regulations.' 4 The recent
Supreme Court decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines
Inc., t 5 however, halted the states' ability to enforce their
own consumer protection laws in the airline advertising
9 Id.
10 Bill Poling, Consumer Groups Continue to Battle Carriers, DOT over Ads, TRAVEL
WKLY, Oct. 23, 1989, at 10. Consumer organizations that are unhappy with the
DOT's regulations include the Consumer Federation of America, the National
Consumers League, the National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators, the Aviation Consumer Action Project, and the Consumer Reports Travel
Letter. Id. The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) also objected
to the DOT's methods of regulation and created the NAAG Guidelines for Air
Travel Advertising (NAAG Guidelines). Id. Local consumer protection agencies
have also complained, for example, the New York City Department of Consumer
Affairs. Id.
,, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2040 (1992).
12

14 C.F.R. §§ 380, 399 (1992).

"1

Poling, supra note 10, at 10.

14

Id.

15 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).

608

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

context.' 6 While the Court's decision addressed a purely
jurisdictional question, the Court's holding has a significant impact
on the substance of airline advertising
17
regulation.
This Comment argues that current federal regulation
does not provide adequate consumer protection and that
either Congress or the DOT should take steps to ensure
that fare advertising is not deceptive. Part two outlines
the scope of the DOT's regulation of airline advertising
and discusses the perceived problems arising from this
regulation. Part three examines the opposition to the
DOT's current regulatory practices focusing largely on
the litigation before the Supreme Court. Finally, part
four argues that, in the best interest of both consumers
and the airlines, Congress should provide for concurrent
regulation by the DOT and the states pursuant to the
NAAG Guidelines,' 8 or the DOT should confront the
troublesome airline advertising practices with new federal
regulations.
II.
A.

THE DOT'S REGULATION OF AIRLINE
ADVERTISING
THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL AIRLINE ADVERTISING
REGULATION

Upon enacting the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
(CAA), Congress established a comprehensive scheme for
the federal regulation of the air transportation industry.' 9
By enacting the CAA, Congress sought to promote sound
economic development and safety within the field of civil
aeronautics. 20 The CAA provided for the creation of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to administer necessary
Id.
Supreme Court Asks for Justice Department Opinion on Airline Advertising, AVIATION
DAILY, June 11, 1991, at 485.
16
17

18 Guidelinesfor Air Travel Advertising, 53 ANITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA),

No. 1345, at s-7 (Dec. 17, 1987) [hereinafter NAAG Guidelines].
'9 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 601, 52 Stat. 973, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (Supp. 1992).
20 Id. The CAA also contained § 1106, a savings clause, which provided that
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regulations. 2 ' Through the CAA, Congress attempted to
ensure the best possible service by air carriers and to
eliminate any undue advantages or unfair and deceptive
practices that would harm consumers or competing air
carriers.2 2 This policy, at least nominally, has survived despite significant changes to the federal air transportation
regulatory framework since the CAA's enactment.23
Authority for the federal regulation of airline advertising derives specifically from section 411 of the CAA.24
Section 411 authorized the CAB to determine whether a
party had engaged in deceptive practices and, if so, to order the party to cease and desist from the practices.25 The
CAB did not take any regulatory action addressing airline
advertising until 1975. In that year the CAB promulgated
a regulation, addressing only tour operators, requiring
that tour advertisements include the costs of both the air
and ground components of the tour.26
B.

THE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION ON AIRLINE
ADVERTISING

Congress reversed the longstanding position favoring
extensive economic regulation of air transportation and
opted to deregulate the industry in 1978. Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) in order to restore competition to the airline industry on the
theory that competition would benefit both consumers
and the industry." Consumers would benefit by resulting
the Act would not "abridge or alter" remedies existing at common law or by statute, but is relevant only in addition to such remedies. Id.
21 Id.; 52 Stat. at 980-81.
22 Id.; 52 Stat. at 980; see also H.R. Rep. No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4,
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2859-60; 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374 (requiring air carriers to provide safe and adequate service); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381 (giving the CAB
authority to proceed against unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition).
23 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381.
24 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. at 1003.
25 Id.
26 40 Fed. Reg. 4906 (1975) (formerly codifed at 14 C.F.R. § 399.84).
1301-1551 (1992).
217 49 U.S.C. app. §
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lower fares and the airlines would have an incentive "to
be innovative and more productive. ' 28 While competitive
market forces were to determine airline industry development, the ADA nevertheless reaffirmed the policy, established in the CAA, that regulation was necessary to ensure
protection from deceptive practices.2
As Congress had hoped, enactment of the ADA did lead
to lower airfares and increased numbers of passengers.3 0
Airlines began to compete intensely for travelers.3 '
Airfare advertisements increased dramatically, reflecting
the new price competition.
Regulation of the increased
airline advertising, however, remained minimal. Following deregulation, the DOT has largely limited the scope
of regulation of airline fare advertising to addressing
surcharges, such as international departure taxes, immigration and custom fees, security charges and fees, agriculture inspection fees, and fuel and tourism surcharges,
that are either absent from the advertisement or included
in very small print, separate from a large prominently advertised fare. 3
LARRY N. GERSTON ET AL., THE DEREGULATED SOCIETY

91 (1988).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(3). Congress stressed reliance "on competitive
market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of air services." The
ADA, however, stressed the continuing need for the "development and maintenance of a sound regulatory environment.., responsive to the needs of the public." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(5).
20 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct. 2031
(1992). "Under deregulation, price became a principal means of competing, and
price advertising multiplied immensely." Id.; see also STEVEN MORRISON & CLIF28

29

FORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION vii

(1986).

While the government claims that fares went down as a result of deregulation,
this proposition is subject to dispute. A 1990 report by the Economic Policy Institute found that "[aidjusting for the impact or changes in inflation and fuel prices
which would have occurred with or without deregulation - ticket prices today
are at least 2.6 percent above the level for which they were headed before deregulation took place." PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 1 (1990).
21 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct.
2031.
2 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-4.
32 14 C.F.R. § 399.84 (1992). In 1984, the CAB, responding to numerous complaints that tour operators featured an attractive tour price in large, bold type and
set forth a separate "percentage add-on" in separate, small print, amended the
earlier regulation, applicable to tour operators, that allowed the separate listing of
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For a short time the CAB characterized the separation
of surcharges as a deceptive advertising practice confusing to consumers. 4 The DOT, however, which assumed
the CAB's authority pursuant to the CAB Sunset Act of
1984, 35 has long claimed that the separation of price components is not inherently deceptive and that consumers
rarely complain about the practice to the DOT.36 While
the tour components. The amended regulation prohibited the separation of components. Id. This amendment was also the first regulation applicable explicitly to
direct air carriers, as the CAB extended the regulation to include airfares sold
without a tour component. CAB Adopts Advertising Rulefor Tours and Flights, TRAVEL
WKLY, Dec. 6, 1984, at 3.
Only months after the CAB had prohibited the practice of separating price components on the grounds that it was misleading to consumers, the DOT, assuming
the CAB's authority, issued an "Order Granting Exemption" from the previous
amendment, which allowed advertisers to "unbundle" their advertised fares.
DOT Order No. 85-12-68 (1985). This unbundling provided for the separation of
an international departure tax of three dollars from the primary fare as long as the
tax was stated elsewhere in the advertisement. The DOT explicitly rejected the
argument that the separation of certain price components was deceptive to the
consumer. Id.
The DOT expanded this exemption in a 1988 Order, allowing
direct or indirect carriers for scheduled and charter service, including tour operators, to state foreign departure taxes, security charges,
custom fees, immigration fees, security fees, agriculture inspection
fees, tourism and fuel surcharges, as well as any other surcharges
that ...

may be imposed by the U.S. Federal, State or local govern-

ments, or foreign governments, separately from other charges in advertisements and promotional materials, provided that all such
advertisements clearly and conspicuously state elsewhere in the advertisement the amount of such charges and the services such
charges cover and indicate that such charges must be paid by the
consumer in addition to the advertised price.
DOT Order No. 88-3-25 (1988).
This regulation was amended further in the same year in order to clarify that
any taxes, charges, fees, or surcharges not levied by and remitted to a government
were excluded from the previous exemptions. Id. Orders 88-3-25 and 88-8-2
were vacated for failure to comply with notice-and-comment procedures in Alaska
v. United States, 868 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The DOT, however, has reaffirmed its policy that separate listing of surcharges is permissible in a new 1992
rule. 14 C.F.R. §§ 380, 399 (1992). This rule also codifies the current practice of
allowing the advertisement of one-way fares that are available only on a roundtrip basis, provided the advertisements are clear with regard to the round-trip
conditions. Id.
34 49 Fed. Reg. 49,440 (1984)
(formerly codified at 14 C.F.R. § 399.84).
35 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 43, 98 Stat. 1705
(1978) (Section 411, codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381, remained unchanged).
36 DOT Order No. 85-12-68, at 6-7 (1985).
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the DOT requires the airlines to "clearly and conspicuously" state the surcharges elsewhere in the advertisement, the DOT has not defined "clearly
and
37
advertising.
airline
to
relates
it
as
conspicuously"
CRITICISMS OF THE DOT'S REGULATION OF AIRLINE
ADVERTISING

C.

While the federal government has claimed a commitment to protecting against unfair and deceptive trade
practices in the air transportation industry, many critics
question that commitment in the area of airfare advertising regulation.38 State governments, local governments,
and consumer advocate groups contend that the DOT is
too lax in enforcing the existing regulations. Additionally, critics believe that the DOT neglects, and even condones, the deceptive nature of several airline advertising
practices .3
1.

The DOT's Enforcement Practices

The DOT has a variety of procedures in place to monitor deceptive advertising. The DOT may become aware
of problems by (1) informal complaints from consumers,
(2) routine review of advertisements in newspapers and
periodicals by the DOT's Investigation Division, or (3)
non-routine review of advertisements by attorneys in the
Office for Aviation Enforcement. 40 The DOT's procedures for enforcing its regulations vary as well. If an advertisement has only minor problems, the DOT's
Consumer Office may work with the airline to correct
them. 4 1 If the situation is more serious, the Office of Aviation Enforcement may issue warning letters and, eventu'1

DOT Order No. 88-3-25 (1988).

31Perry Flint, Fine Print Fares:Airline Advertising of Fares, AIR TRANSPORT

WORLD,

Oct. 1989, at 2.
19 Barry Meier, U.S. and States Trade Shots in Battle Over Air-Fare Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1989, at 48.
40 New York v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 162, 171 (S.D.N.Y.

1989).
41 Id.
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ally, may enter into "cease and desist" agreements.42
Finally, the DOT's Consumer Office may assess civil penalties or bring an action against the air carrier.43
Despite the presence of structured procedures, the
DOT has faced severe criticism for the low number of violations that the DOT has discovered and the even lower
number of penalties that the DOT has assessed.44 From
1984 to 1991, only seven cease and desist orders involved
airline advertising. 45 The low numbers are probably attributable to the fact that only between two and four DOT
inspectors are searching for deceptive advertisements and
the DOT has admitted to being administratively "overwhelmed." '46 As the DOT is, at least presently, the only
42

Id.

43 Id.

44 Flint, supra note 38, at 2; see, e.g., DOT Order No. 88-8-3 (1988) (Continental
Airlines, Inc. fined $9,500 for failing to disclose that a one-way fare is subject to a
round-trip purchase requirement, violating 14 C.F.R. § 399.84); DOT Order No.
89-4-25 (1989) (Pan American World Airways, Inc. assessed a $20,000 penalty for
listing "fuel surcharges separately from fares .. .in a number of newspapers");
DOT Order No. 91-9-45 (1991) (American Airlines, Inc. assessed a $12,000 fine
for advertising fares alongside twelve destinations when travel to only three of the
twelve destinations was available at the stated rate).
Interestingly, in 1988, the DOT issued only "four consent orders against companies engaged in false or misleading airline advertising" and "uncovered only
three of these instances" themselves. Flint, supra note 39, at 2. The fourth was
discovered by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and was located, incredibly,
"in the Washington D.C. Metro subway that stops at DOT headquarters ....
Leaving aside the implausibility of there being only four misleading airline-fare
advertisements in all of 1988, one has to wonder about the eagerness of DOT to
pursue offenders when such ads go unnoticed literally under its nose." Id.
45 S.J. Diamond, Consumer Affairs: Some Airlines Mislead Without Lying, L.A. TIMES,
June 14, 1991, at ID. The DOT, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, has
directed the majority of its funding and manpower to safety issues and has not
focused on consumer grievances. Allison Leigh Cowan & Edward A. Gargan, Mirage of Discount Fares is Frustratingto Many Fliers, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1991, at Al.
As a result, the airlines have taken advantage of the lax federal monitoring in the
area of advertising. Id. Critics also cite other consumer abuses arising from a lack
of government oversight: "miserable service .... deliberate overbooking, unrealistic scheduling, and demand based flight cancellations." DEMPSEY, supra note 30,
at 40.
46 Eric Weiner, DecodingAdsfor Special Fares, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1990, at 32; see
also Cowan & Gargan, supra note 45, at AI (In light of the fact that the Department
has only four people scrutinizing the "$730 million in media advertising that the
airlines buy each year," it is no surprise that the "airlines feel free to do just about
anything in their ads ....
because who is going to take them on?").
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party responsible for protecting consumers from deceptive advertising, the fact that the DOT expends so little
effort in policing airline advertisements is troublesome.47
Several parties, including another department of the
federal government, the General Accounting Office
(GAO), have noted a need for increased cooperation between the DOT and the state governments in policing airline advertising. 48 DOT General Counsel Phillip Brady
claims that the DOT desires coordinated consumer protection activities and has tried to improve communications with state governments. 49 Effective cooperation,
however, seems unlikely due to a fundamental disagreement between the DOT and the state attorneys general as
to the substance of necessary airfare advertising
regulation.50
2.

The DOT's Fairlureto Address Misleading Airfare Practices

The substance, or perceived lack of substance, of the
DOT's regulations is the primary focus of the ongoing
dispute. Consumers and various agencies have widely
characterized airline fare advertisements as deceptive,
claiming that several particular advertising practices pre47 Arthur Best, Controlling FalseAdvertising, 20 GA. L. REV. 24 (1985). There is
no private cause of action for consumers arising out of 49 U.S.C. § 1381. Injured
competitors of parties engaged in deceptive advertising may initiate litigation pursuant to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Id.; see also Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. New York Air Lines, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
enforcing 565 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (advertising of air-shuttle service
comparable to competitor's was misleading when shuttle service was not similar);
American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (misappropriation of name).
48 The GAO issued a report calling for cooperation between the DOT and the
states in policing the airline industry after concluding that the DOT did not have
the manpower necessary to be the sole party responsible for monitoring airline
advertising. Meier, supra note 39, at 48.
49 Bill Poling, DOT Attempts to Bridge Rift With States' Attorneys General, TRAVEL
WKLY, Oct. 8, 1990, at 99. DOT agents have "lamented recently that federal
sleuths simply are not getting much in the way of tips, inquiries or assistance from
... state officials anymore." Id. Thus far, however, the DOT has only appealed to
"state officials to contact the DOT 'any time [they] become aware of any unfair or
deceptive practices [pursuant to federal law] in the airline industry.' " Id.
50 Id.
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vent the consumer from assessing the actual cost of the
advertised fare and the restrictions and limitations that
apply to the fare. 5' These advertising practices are (1) the
separation of taxes, fees, and surcharges from a boldly advertised fare; (2) limitations and restrictions that are
either absent from an advertisement or are poorly disclosed; and (3) the advertising of fares that are rarely
available for the advertised route.52
a.

Controversial Airfare Advertising Practices

Airlines often advertise one low fare in large, bold print
and include various surcharges in tiny, mouse print in an
attempt to make the boldly advertised fare appear as low
as possible. The mouse print is often as much as 136
times smaller than the boldly advertised fare. 54 This practice, among others, is often characterized as a bait-andswitch routine; the airlines lure ticket-purchasers in with
the promise of a low price, but, ultimately, sell a ticket at a
significantly higher price.
The mouse print in airline advertisements also includes
limitations and restrictions on the airfare in addition to
surcharges. 55 For example, the ticket's status as non-refundable, non-transferable or non-exchangeable is often
included only in small print. 56 This practice allows the
Poling, supra note 10, at 10.
Id.; Diamond, supra note 45, at DI. The NAAG Guidelines also address "frequent flyer" or "travel reward" programs by the airlines. The most common
problem arising from these programs is unilateral modification. Preate: Feds
Shouldn't Condone Misleading Airline Ads, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 26, 1989. Several
airlines unilaterally increase the mileage level needed for awards to popular destinations. Id. at 32. The airlines, at least temporarily, have rolled back such
changes due to a "flurry of class action lawsuits, and negative press." Weiner,
supra note 46, at 32.
53 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-3; Mark Pestronk, Airline's 'Rip-offs'Require
Regulations, TRAVEL WKLY, June 11, 1990, at 44. The airlines claim that the
surcharges are listed separately to let the consumer know that the Government
imposes many of them as opposed to the airline. Weiner, supra note 46, at 32.
54 Meier, supra note 39, at 48.
55 Id.; NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18; Commissioner Mark Green, N.Y.C. Dep't
of Consumer Affairs Report, Flights of Fancy: Deception in Airfare Ads, July 1990.
56 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-8.
5

52
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airlines to reduce any loss due to "no-shows" by shifting
the risk of any change in plans to the consumer.57 Airlines
also commonly advertise the cost of a one-way fare in
large bold print but only mention that the fare is subject
to a round-trip purchase in the small print. 58 An actual
one-way fare is often much higher than the advertised
price. 59 The small print also often includes advancepurchase requirements, cancellation and change of itinerary penalties, and length of stay requirements.60
In addition to the difficulties in assessing the actual fare
and conditions placed on the advertised ticket, critics
complain that airline advertisements also neglect to convey the availability of the fare. Airlines have a sophisticated computerized marketing technique, known as
''yield-management," that allows the airlines to change
fares constantly upon indication of a changing demand
for a particular flight. 61 Air fare advertisements, however,
do not reflect the fact that an advertised fare is subject to
continual fluctuations of availability. 62 Consumers have
no guarantee that the advertised fares of many of the major airlines will be available, even on the date that the advertisement runs. 63 At most, airlines are required to
57 Id. Consumers who have a change of plans "forego any refunds of the price
of the ticket." Id. at s-5.
-8 Meier, supra note 39, at 48.
59 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-3.
o Meier, supra note 39, at 48.
61 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-4, 5. "[Alirlines make thousands of fare
changes in their computers every day." Id. "If full fare seats are selling well, the
number of seats allocated for low fare seats can be reduced temporarily, only to
be increased later if unsold costlier seats remain." Id. "The frustration stems
from the airlines' increasing skill at mixing the balance of low and high priced
seats on a given flight right up until takeoff.... This "yield-management" pricing
has spread rapidly in the 13 years since the airlines were deregulated and is constantly being refined with the use of cheaper and ever-more-powerful computers."
Cowan, supra note 46, at Al.
62 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-5.
63 Cowan & Gargan, supra note 45, at Al.
Many consumers have been frustrated by the advertisements. Group Proposes thatAds Reveal FareAvailability, TRAVEL
WKLY, March 23, 1987, at 1. "If an airline is going to . . . emphasize price, it is
realistic for travelers to assume that by acting diligently, they will have at least a
reasonable opportunity to purchase the fares being advertised." Id.
More often than not, the wrath of the upset consumer is directed at travel
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convey only that the availability of the discounted fare is
limited.6 Air travelers, therefore, have to face the fact
that only five to twenty per cent of the seats may be initially allotted to the advertised discount price and must
face, additionally, the probability that the number of available fares will rapidly decrease
further as the "[a]d whips
65
up customer demand.

State laws prohibit other industries from all of these advertising practices, as does the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 66 For example, the FTC and state laws have

consistently required price advertisers of an item to have a
quantity of that item in stock to sufficiently meet the "anticipated demand" created by an advertisement, or, if inventory does not meet this demand, the advertisement
must announce the possible shortfall in "prominent disclaimers.

' 67

These laws, however, seem not to apply to

the airlines, and the DOT shows no intention of promulgating comparable regulations.6 8
agents who have nothing to do with the airlines' pricing practices. Cowan & Gargan, supra note 45, at Al. Interestingly enough, some travel agents are now
"fighting back" by using their own computer systems to monitor the airlines' price
changes and tapping in to purchase tickets for their clients at the lowest fees.
While this may lower their immediate commissions, their focus is on client loyalty,
a goal the airlines have not pursued. Id.
61 Weiner, supra note 46, at 32.
65 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct. 2031
(1992).
66 Air Transport:Airline Observer, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 26, 1987, at
41.
67 Cowan & Gargan, supra note 45, at Al. Airlines maintain that "yield-management" is a "matter of survival" in the competitive market of deregulation, but
former airline executives and state officials recommend a "clean-up" of the practice, noting that, unfortunately, there are no cops. Id.
68 Air Transport: Airline Observer, supra note 66, at 41. The airlines are exempt
from FTC regulations. Id. There was a vote in the House of Representatives on
Oct. 7, 1987, to shift authority for regulating airline advertisements from the
DOT to the FTC, but the motion lost by a 246 to 171 vote. Id. Nevertheless,
consumer advocates want to know why the "airlines get a break that no one else
does." According to former Texas Assistant Attorney General Steve Gardner,
"Busses, trains, taxis and blimps cannot ignore state laws." Poling, supra note 3,
at 99.
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The DOT's Regulatory Philisophy

The DOT has not taken any action to prevent these particular practices because it claims that the practices are
not misleading to consumers and that, even if the advertisements are potentially confusing, the practices are not
harmful enough to warrant a restriction on competition.69
The DOT and its supporters contend that consumers' interests are adequately protected by the combination of existing federal regulation, the ability of national advertisers
to bring deceptive advertising actions against their competitors, and the advertising industry's self-regulation
processes.7 ° The DOT's refusal to consider implementing additional regulation reflects the DOT's philosophy
that consumers and the airline industry are best served by
avoiding excessive regulation.7 '
According to the DOT, if its consumer protection authority is to be properly exercised in the public interest,
competition must be a consideration in determining the
best overall regulatory policy for consumers. 72 The DOT
claims that consumers will be served optimally by the fewest possible restrictions on airline price competition.73
Further, the DOT contends that any expanded regulation
of airline advertising would force certain information,
such as fares, out of national advertising and, therefore,
limit airline price competition.74 Consumers then would
14 C.F.R. §§ 380, 399 (1992).
Don Hanaway & David S. Versfelt, What Should Be the Role of the State Attorneys
General in National Advertising?, 3 ANTITRUST, 39, 41 (1989).
71 Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to
Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST 49, 73 (1989). "When
Congress deregulated the airline industry in 1978, it did not want the airlines
handcuffed by local or state laws." Poling, supra note 3, at 99.
72 14 C.F.R. §§ 380, 399.
73 Id. The ADA defined "in the interest of the public" to include "maximum
reliance on competitive market forces." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(4).
74 14 C.F.R. §§ 380, 399. The DOT's philosophy has been pervasive in the area
of federal regulation of deceptive advertising throughout the Reagan and Bush
administrations. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) shares the DOT's philosophy with regard to advertising regulation claiming that "excessive government
intrusion in advertising hurts business by increasing the costs of disseminating
information, and hurts consumers by limiting access to useful information" as the
69

70
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not have any opportunity to take advantage of discounted
fares.75 The DOT admits, however, that the preservation
of competition never calls for the toleration of advertisements conveying deceptive information. 6 The difficulty
arises over whether the airfare advertising practices in
question qualify as deceptive.
Currently, the only explicit regulation of fare advertising that the DOT has found "necessary" to prevent deceptive advertising requires that the entire fare be
included some place in the advertisement.7 7 The DOT
supports the airlines' practice of "unbundling" fares as
long as the applicable surcharges are listed somewhere in
the advertisement. The DOT contends that it would be
virtually impossible for the airlines to meet a single fare
requirement, including all applicable charges, as some of
the surcharges do not apply uniformly in all markets.78
Similarly, the DOT feels that any regulation that would
limit the airlines' yield management practices would unnecessarily lead to the elimination of lower fares. Because
air travel is highly seasonal, airlines often operate with
empty seats. 79 As a result, airlines try to recoup costs by
"[high costs and fear of liability may chill the dissemination of useful information
contained in advertisements." Alexander G. Fraser, The Federal Trade Commission
Enforcement Against Deceptive Advertising, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 537, 538 (1986).
Observers note that the federal government's "policy of deregulation threatens to
undermine... past achievements in consumer protection and return the public to
the principles of caveat emptor." Id. at 539-40. The long-term result of such lax
regulation will be to "reduce the credibility of advertisements, diminish consumer
protection, and damage the business community." Id. at 540.
Consumers seem to agree with this analysis and are opposed to reduced regulation of advertising. A 1983 study "revealed that 91% of those randomly polled
support governmental enforcement against deceptive advertising" and that 59%
felt that "the government is not doing enough to prevent deception." Id. at 539
n.9.
15 Fraser, supra note 74, at 539.
76 54 Fed. Reg. 31,052, 31,053 (1989); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 12, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
77 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct.
2031.
78 Id. "[T]he total price of a ticket may vary up to $12 depending on the embarkation, disembarkation, and connecting airports to be used by the traveller." Id.
79 Id. Airlines serve two major markets: (1) individuals, primarily business travelers, with a "relatively inelastic" demand for air travel; and (2) travelers, primar-
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filling would-be empty seats with consumers who pay
lower fares and by charging higher fares to persons with
an inelastic demand for air travel. 80 The DOT allows airline advertisements to continue advertising fares when a
particular fare may not be available, contending that it is
too burdensome for airlines to represent the complexity
of fare availability in an advertisement. 8 ' Furthermore,
DOT representatives claim that consumers have come to
understand the advertising practices and are used to it,
maintaining that consumers rarely complain to the
DOT. 82 The National Advertising Division of the Council
of Better Business Bureaus (NAD) supports the DOT's
claim, stating that they faced a "declining case load" during the '80s.83
ily tourists, who have "less stringent demands in terms of schedules and notice"
and are "sensitive to changes in the price of air travel." Id.
SId. at 10.
8' Id. The government claims that it is "increasingly difficult to convey in any
advertisement the full complexity of the fare structure and ticket restrictions,
while keeping the advertisement sufficiently short and clear so that it can serve as
an affordable and effective price competition tool." Id.
82 Diamond, supra note 45, at ID. The DOT standard for fair advertising is if
"[a]n ordinary person reading such ads would be aware of the total amount to be
paid for the transportation and, in addition, would be provided with valuable information on associated government imposed or approved surcharges." 14
C.F.R. §§ 380, 399. The DOT contends that "cases in which false or misleading
national advertising could result in harm to a reasonable customer are -increasingly rare." Diamond, supra note 45, at ID. However, critics note that "disgruntled passengers simply can't get through to the department's understaffed hot line
to complain." Weiner, supra note 46, at 32.
83 Diamond, supra note 45, at ID. The advertising industry spoke loudly in opposition to the prospect of state enforcement of state laws. The advertising industry, opposed to the NAAG's attempt to erect a new regulatory scheme upon
national advertisers without first consulting the industry or its representatives, insisted that the NAAG first demonstrate that state regulation will serve to regulate
,more efficiently" than the current federal structure and will not result in a lack of
uniformity. John O'Toole, A Crazy Quilt of Ad Regulation, ADwEEK, Mar. 28, 1988,
at 20.
The Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB) suggested that advertisers become more involved in the regulation and the CBBB "urged the states to shift
gears and work through the advertising industry's self-regulation process." Jennifer Lawrence, Feds Tell States to Back Off on Ad Restrictions, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar.

7, 1988, at 2. State officials were "encouraged" to "[w]ork through the CBBB's
National Advertising Division, which reviews complaints about national advertising and has handled more than a dozen cases involving airline ads." Id. A dozen
or so investigations by the NAD, however, hardly seems to constitute an "expan-
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The number of consumer complaints regarding airline
advertising, however, is widely disputed. Consumers
complained to their state attorneys general and consumer
protection agencies often enough to lead those parties to
characterize consumer dissatisfaction as having reached
"crisis proportions. 8 4 Despite the DOT's intentions to
protect consumers, many parties are left with the feeling
that the DOT offers no legitimate reason to exempt the
airline industry from the standards of advertising accountability that apply to all other industries across the country.85 The rising numbers of consumer complaints led the
NAAG, local consumer protection agencies, and members
of Congress to challenge the DOT's current scheme of
regulation.8 6
III.

SUGGESTIONS AND CHALLENGES TO THE
DOT'S REGULATION OF AIRLINE
ADVERTISING

While the DOT may consider current airfare advertising practices relatively harmless in comparison to a possible chill on airline price competition that might arise from
broader regulations, consumers are still upset by many
advertisements. 87 The notion of deceptive advertising
from the perspective of a potential ticket purchaser differs
dramatically from the perspective of the DOT, which is
committed to protecting competition within the air transsive involvement" in light of the fact that the state agencies characterize the com-

plaints they receive as reaching "crisis proportions." Id. The CBBB's suggestion
was endorsed by the Association of National Advertisers, the American Association of Advertising Agencies and the American Advertising Federation, all of
whom co-sponsor the NAD program. Id.; see also, Power Grabbers?Attorneys General
Test Regulatory Muscle, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 7, 1988, at 2.

I Diamond, supra note 45, at ID. "That numerous states have joined in a common interpretation of these statutes indicates a significant national consensus that
the airline industry has engaged in widespread false, misleading and deceptive
practices." Felix H. Kent, Curb on State Power to Regulate Advertising, N.Y. L.J., March
24, 1989, at 4.
85 Preate: Feds Shouldn't Condone Misleading Airline Ads, supra note 52.
86 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-3.
87 Id.
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portation industry,88 despite the fact that both parties
want to secure the lowest fares possible. Widespread dissatisfaction with the DOT's regulation of airline advertising has prompted calls for a change in DOT policy, which
resulted in a direct challenge to the DOT's regulatory authority, and calls for Congress to amend the current
legislation.
A.

ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL REGULATIONS

Many parties would like to see the DOT adopt and enforce broader regulations. New York City's Consumer Affairs Commissioner, Mark Green, following a thorough
investigation of the DOT's regulation of airline advertising, made explicit suggestions to the DOT for improved
consumer protection.8 9 The suggestions were comprised
mostly of regulations already applicable to advertising on
state and local levels. 90 They were (1) to rescind DOT
regulations that allow the exclusion of fees and taxes from
advertised fares; (2) to draft new regulations requiring advertisements to clearly display restrictions such as advance-purchases, non-refundability, and penalties for
88 See supra notes 72-76 & infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.

89 Rhea Mandulo, Green: ProsecuteAirlines for False Advertising, UPI, July 17, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file. Green concluded that the DOT has
ignored the problem of deceptive advertising practices and appealed to Samuel
Skinner, the United States Secretary of Transportation, "to either pursue the
charges," or to let local and state governments "protect the flying public." Id.
Green singled out Continental Airlines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., Midway
Airlines, Inc. and Delta Airlines, Inc. for most often failing to provide passenger
space at the advertised rates. Id. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Pan American World
Airways, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., British Airway, Ltd.,
and Midway Airlines, Inc. were the airlines cited for advertising low one-way fares
and announcing that a round-trip purchase was required to obtain the advertised
fare in very small, fine print. Id.; see also Pestronk, supra note 53, at 44; Consumer
Affairs Commissioner Asks DOT to Stop Deceptive Ads, AVIATION DAILY, July 20, 1990, at
129. Continental denied the findings and cited full compliance with DOT's regulations. Continental Airlines Refutes Commissioner's Announcement, SOUTHWEST NEwSWIRE distributed to Business/Aviation Desks, July 17, 1990.
- Pestronk, supra note 53, at 44. Public service groups have actively encouraged either tougher federal regulations or state enforcement. Aviation Consumer Action Project, a Washington-based group, "has been urging the
Transportation Department to compel airlines to set aside at least 10 per cent of
their seats at the prices they advertise." Id.
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itinerary changes; (3) to draft regulations prohibiting the
practice of advertising one-way fares that are available
only by purchasing round-trip tickets; and (4) to penalize
airlines for not having sufficient seats available to meet
the demand that could reasonably be expected upon publication of an advertisement. 9 '
Congress, although only cursorily thus far, has also addressed the DOT's regulatory policies. Senator Howard
Metzenbaum and Representative Peter A. DeFazio sponsored the Airline Consumer Rights Bill in March of 1987
that aimed to make the airline industry more accountable
to the public.92 The bill, if enacted, would have required
airlines that advertise discounted fares to set aside at least
one-third of the seats on the flights advertised at the
quoted price.93 The bill also called for the disclosure of
several specific restrictions in advertisements.94 There is
also a bill in the House of Representatives currently that
would amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to pro95
vide for FTC regulation of airline advertising.
B.

CONCURRENT STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION

As an alternative to more expansive federal regulation
by the DOT, critics have supported efforts by states' attorneys general to enforce their own, more rigorous, state
advertising laws. Despite the DOT's widespread authority
to regulate the airline industry, several state attorney general offices, opposing what they perceived as lackadaisical
federal regulation, have tried to regulate airline advertis9, Id.; see Consumer Affairs Commission Asks DOT to Stop Deceptive Ads, supra note 89,

at 129.
92 S. 885, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1866, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
" S. 885, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1987).
- Id. § 4(b) (1987). The bill would have required disclosure of "all restrictions
with respect to advance purchase of tickets, refundability of money, minimum stay
requirements, and any and all other restrictions or conditions with respect
thereto." Id.
95 H.R. 5124, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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ing pursuant to their own state laws. 96 These state attorneys general acted to regulate airline advertising pursuant
to guidelines adopted by the NAAG.
1.

The NAAG Guidelines

In December 1987, the NAAG adopted Guidelines for
Air Travel Advertising (NAAG Guidelines).9 The NAAG
Guidelines were a response to increased consumer complaints about airline advertising to states' attorney general
offices and consumer affairs departments.9 8 The NAAG
directed a task force to investigate the nature of the consumer complaints and to determine if existing airline advertising practices were deceptive. 99 The NAAG task
force determined that several fare advertising practices
were misleading to consumers and issued the NAAG
Guidelines to notify the airlines of the problem practices
and to demonstrate what action needed to be taken to
conform the advertisements to state advertising law requirements. 00° The NAAG Guidelines were to prevent
deception by ensuring that airfare advertisements conveyed certain basic information to consumers. The information is (1) whether the consumer would be eligible for
the advertised fare, (2) the risks to the consumer associated with purchasing the ticket at the advertised price, and
(3) whether the consumer could determine the actual
availability of a ticket offered at the advertised price.' 0 '
96 Kansas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 366 (D. Kan. 1990); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989); New York v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); California v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
97 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-2.

98 Id.

- Id. at s-3. Airline advertisements often characterize fares offered as special
low fares but the fact is that the "majority of airline tickets sold each year sell at
prices significantly lower than the . . . standard regular coach fare." Id. at s-I 1.
This restriction would require that only those fares that "represent a true savings
over regularly available air fares," such as those that are available for short periods of time and are substantially below any regularly offered fare, would carry a
term qualifying them as a special or discounted fare. Id.
- Id. at s-10.
101Id. at s-9.
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Like the regulations proposed to the DOT by the New
York City Consumer Affairs Department,1 0 2 the NAAG
Guidelines reflect requirements for price advertising that
state and local advertising laws already dictate. 103 Specifically, the NAAG Guidelines require that a single, total advertised price of the fare include all surcharges and that
round-trip fare advertising be identified as such.10 4 The
NAAG Guidelines also prohibit the deceptive use of terms
such as "sale," "discount," "reduced," or other similar
qualifiers. 0 5 A sufficient quantity of the advertised fares
must be available to meet the applicable market's "reasonably foreseeable demand."' 0 6 Perhaps most importantly, and unlike current federal requirements, the
NAAG Guidelines define what is meant by "clear and conspicuous" in terms of size, color, contrast, and audibility
in order to protect consumers in the 10realm
of print, bill7
advertisements.
broadcast
board and
Despite the fact that the easiest path for the states
would be to take a free ride from the federal government
and not incur the expense of enforcing their own regulations, the state attorneys general clearly felt an overwhelming duty to protect their consumers and concluded
that the DOT had neglected its duty. 0 8 The NAAG
102

Mandulo, supra note 89. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.

10 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-8.

I Id. at s-10.
105

Id.

-o Id. at s-9.
107 Id. at s-7. "Clear and conspicuous," for example in print advertising, would
require that certain restrictions and limitations that are often outlined in tiny
"mouse" print must be "at least one-third the size of the largest type size used in
the advertising," or "10-point type in advertisements that are 200 square inches
or smaller, [or] 12-point type in advertisements that are larger than 200 square
inches." Id. Examples of the type of restrictions that the NAAG Guidelines require to be "clear and conspicuous" are: limited-time availability; limitations on
right to refund or exchange of ticket; length of stay requirements; advance
purchase requirements; and round-trip purchase requirements. Id. at s-8.
108 Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842, 846 (1989) [hereinafter Perfect Union?]. Individual
state attorneys general certainly have the opportunity to try and increase their
own political clout by actively regulating national airline advertising. But the
political position of the state attorney general can be more advantageous than that
of an administrative agency, such as the DOT. As the state attorneys general are
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Guidelines gave notice to the federal government that
states and consumers were not pleased with either the
substance or enforcement of the existing federal regulations and that the states intended to enforce their own
consumer protection laws.' 0 9 The attorneys general
adopted the NAAG Guidelines with the hope that the airline industry would comply and that litigation would be
unnecessary. I10
2.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox"'

Unfortunately, the NAAG Guidelines resulted in exactly
the litigation that the NAAG sought to avoid. In November 1988, then Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox,
joined by the attorneys general of California, Massachusetts, New York, and Washington, notified three major
airlines that their national advertisements, which did not
violate federal law, violated the NAAG Guidelines and
Texas deceptive advertising laws. 1 2 The airlines failed to
include taxes and surcharges in a single advertised fare."'
Mattox threatened prosecution unless the airlines ceased
publishing the particular advertisements."t 4 The airlines
did stop the advertisements that were illegal under Texas
law, but only briefly. 1 5 The airlines, in an effort to enjoin
any attempt by Mattox to prosecute, responded by filing
elected, they are closer to "constituents' needs and, admittedly, the potential
political benefits of serving consumers needs are not lost on [them]." Hanaway &
Versfelt, supra note 71, at 40.
-o NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-6.
10 Id.
-I' 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

111 S. Ct. 307 (1990).
112 Mattox, 897 F.2d at 775. The three airlines were Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
Continental Airlines, Inc., and British Airways, Ltd. The Attorney General
claimed that the airline advertisements violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987). Id. at
776.
112Supreme Courts Asks forJustice DepartmentOpinion of Airline Advertising, supra note

17, at 485.
Mattox, 712 F. Supp. at 102.
Laurie P. Cohen, TV Networks Balking at Ad Guidelines on Disclosure of Air Fare
Restrictions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at 44.
114

115
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suit in federal district court in Texas. 16
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox,1 7 the airlines contended that federal law preempted any attempt by the
states to regulate airfare advertising according to their
own state laws. The applicable federal law provides that
"any [State] law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates,
routes or services" of any interstate air carrier is preempted by federal regulation." 8 The airlines claimed that
airline advertising related to "rates, routes or services"
and, thus, was not subject to state consumer protection
laws. The airlines maintained that the preemption clause
was specifically added by Congress at the time of deregulation to avoid any prospect of conflicting state
regulation.
Mattox argued that advertising was too indirectly related to "rates, routes or services" to be expressly preempted and that a savings clause in the federal act
preserved such a state action." 9 Mattox contended that
Congress included an exclusive list of practices that the
states could not regulate in the legislative history and the
absence of advertising from the list indicated that advertising was not properly included in the "relating to" language. Furthermore, the savings clause provided that the
federal regulations shall not "abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute."'' 20 Mattox claimed that state regulation of advertising has
consistently played a crucial role in the marketplace and
that, as Congress intended to subject the airline industry
to the full extent of marketplace conditions, airline advertising regulation was the very type of regulation that Congress intended to protect.
Thirty-three other states joined in opposing the air116

Mattox, 712 F. Supp. at 102.

117 Id.

118 49
"9
120

U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
The savings clause is 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1506.
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lines' motion and specially appeared in federal district
court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox. t 2' Meanwhile,
three other attorneys general brought charges against airlines in federal district court in their own states for violations of applicable state consumer protection laws. 22
These other federal courts, as well as a state court, agreed
with Mattox's analysis.' 23 While all of the other federal
district courts remanded the cases to state court, the district court in Texas granted the preliminary injunction
sought by the airlines on the grounds that it was probable
that the plaintiffs could establish their claim of
24
preemption.
Upon a motion by the airlines, the district court in
Texas broadened the preliminary injunction to include all
of the attorneys general who specially appeared and attempted to use state law to enforce the NAAG Guide12, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 102 (W.D. Tex. 1989)
(states made special appearances without submitting to subject matter or personal
jurisdiction).
122See Kansas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 366 (D. Kan. 1990)
(Kansas suit against Trans World Airlines on April 3, 1989 for violating §§ 50626(a),(b)(2) & (5), 50-627(a), (b) of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act.); New
York v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); (New York
suit against Trans World Airlines on March 29, 1989, and Pan American Airlines
on April 20, 1989, for "persistent fraudulent conduct" in violation of Executive
Law § 63(12)); California v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.
Cal. 1989) (California suit against Trans World Airlines on March 9, 1989, for
violation of California Business and Professions Code § § 17200, 17500, 17504);
People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
121See Kansas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. at 368; New York v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. at 175-80; California v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 720 F. Supp. at 829; People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr.
at 237-39.
124Mallox, 712 F. Supp. at 101; see Kansas v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 730 F.
Supp. 366 (D. Kan. 1990) (no finding of preemption because "relating to" language does not by its terms include advertising); New York v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding no legislative intent to
support preemption of state regulation regarding deceptive advertising); California v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 826, aft'd, 726 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.
Cal. 1989) (remanding to state court because federal law "which arguably
preempts the state law cause of action must itself create a cause of action applicable to plaintiff before the federal court may establish removal jurisdiction under
the 'complete preemption' doctrine").
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lines. 125 The court also allowed the intervention of ten
additional airlines as plaintiffs.126 This decision had the
immediate effect of prompting air carriers to actively ad127
vertise the "unbundled" fares again.
Mattox appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. The court held that the district court properly issued the preliminary injunction as the legislative intent of
section 1305(a)(1) indicated that Congress wished to preclude all state regulation in order to prevent conflicting
regulations. 28 As congressional intent is the crucial factor for determining preemption, the court concluded that
the states were without authority to take action against
airline advertisements that are deceptive pursuant to state
law. 129 Although the final judgment in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Mattox was not binding on the other federal district
courts in which the attorneys general filed suit prior to the
broadening of the preliminary injunction, 30 the state
courts, to which the cases had been remanded, deferred
to the Fifth Circuit under the principles of res judicata
125 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 105-06 (W.D. Tex.
1989).
126 Id. at 104. The airlines were Lufthansa German Airlines, Air Canada, Compagnie National Air France, Alitalia-Lines Aeree Italiane, El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd., Finnair, Japan Airlines Company, Ltd., Quantas Airways, Ltd., Scandinavian
Airlines System, and Viacao Aerea Rio-Grandense. Id. at 102.
127Jennifer Lawrence, Airlines Win First NAAG Bout, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 6,
1989, at 8; see also Meier, supra note 39, at 48. This decision, coupled with a 1988
DOT Order that expressly permitted the unbundling of certain surcharges,
spurred the airlines to resume fare advertising. Meier, supra note 39 at 48.
128 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 307 (1990); see Arcie I. Jordan & Kenneth R. Hoffman, Regulating For-Hire
Motor Vehicles, 19 TRANsP. L.J. 342, 343 (1991).
129 Mattox, 897 F.2d at 783. The court relied on the congressional intent expressed in H.R. Rep. No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2857, 2860. See also Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines,
Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that price advertising "surely" relates
to price), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990). As the preemption was found to be
express, the "absence of contrary federal law is irrelevant" and, thus, the savings
clause is inapplicable. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d at 754. For
an in-depth analysis of the preemption arguments and the court's rationale, see
Daniel Petroski, Airlines' Response to the DTPA Section 1305 Preemption, 56J. AIR. L. &
CoM. 125 (1990).
1O See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
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and collateral estoppel.13 1 The Fifth Circuit again affirmed the district court, upon a second appeal, when the
district court subsequently granted a permanent injunction protecting the airlines from any action by the states
32
to enforce deceptive advertising laws. 1
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. '33 thirty-three state
attorneys general joined Texas Attorney General Dan
Morales, Mattox's successor, in appealing the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court agreed to consider
whether "enforcement of the NAAG guidelines on fare
advertising through a State's general consumer protection
laws is pre-empted by the ADA."'' 3 4 The majority of the
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's opinion, firmly
establishing that the DOT has sole authority to regulate
airline advertising. This decision, while not addressing
the merits of current airfare advertising practices, strongly
influences the substance of airline advertising regulation.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,' 35 held that the
''relating to" language of the preemption provision of the
ADA indicated that Congress intended that the ADA
broadly preempt state laws and regulations, analogizing
the language to that used in the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a).' 36 The majority agreed with the airlines' contention that the regulations set out in the NAAG Guide13, Pan American Airways, Inc. v. Abrams, 764 F. Supp. 864, 868 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (following state court's deference to Fifth Circuit's Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Mattox opinion in Abrams v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 556 N.Y.S.2d 803
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990)); People v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 609941,
slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego Co. Aug. 24, 1990); State v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., No. 89-CV-567, slip op. at 5 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Shawnee Co. Aug. 11,
1990).
132 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 949 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd 112 S.
Ct. 2031 (1992).
133 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992). See also California v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 2794, (1991) (also appealing the decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Mattox, 897 F.2d 773).
114 Morales IV, 112 S. Ct. at 2036.
"3- Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's
opinion. Justice Souter did not participate in the decision.
136 Morales IV, 112 S. Ct. at 2037. "Since the relevant language of the ADA is
identical, we think it is appropriate to adopt the same standard here: State en-
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lines "related to" air fares and that enforcement of these
regulations would have a "significant" economic impact
on airline rates. 3 7 While Scalia noted that the airlines do
not have "carte blanche" to engage in deceptive advertising, he characterized the scope of the DOT's regulatory
in its
power as the prohibition of "advertisements ' which
38
pricing."'
competitive
further
not
do
opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Blackmun, dissented and took exception to both
the majority's analysis of the preemption issue and the
conclusion that the NAAG Guidelines would have an actual detrimental economic impact on the airline industry.' 3 9 Justice Stevens noted that "[s]urely Congress
could not have intended to pre-empt every state and local
law and regulation that similarly increases the airlines'
costs of doing business and, consequently, has a similar
'significant impact' upon their rates."' 4
The Supreme Court's opinion elicited a quick response
from NAAG. Only a few weeks after the Supreme Court
resolved the preemption issue in favor of the airlines, the
NAAG adopted a resolution seeking congressional action
to amend the ADA to clarify "the states' authority to enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline rates, routes, or
services are preempted under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1)." Id.
'3, Id. at 2039. Scalia wrote that the guidelines "establish binding requirements
as to how tickets may be marketed if they are to be sold at given prices" and that,
beyond the express references to air fares in the NAAG Guidelines, the "state
restrictions on fare advertising have the forbidden significant effect upon fares."
Id.
138Id. at 2040.

139Stevens argues that the majority does not focus on the "language, structure,
and history of the ADA" in analyzing the effect of the ADA preemption provision,
but rather adopts a broad construction of the "relating to" language on the basis
of "similar, but by no means identical, language" found in ERISA. Id. at 2055.
Stevens contends that such a construction is "neither compelled by [the ADA's]
text nor supported by its legislative history." Id. Furthermore, even if the Court
would consider that state regulation of air fare advertising would relate to rates
within the meaning of the preemption provision if the regulation had a "significant impact upon the price of airline tickets," the dissent does not agree with the
majority's decision to accept the airlines' theoretical argument that the NAAG
Guidelines will have this "significant" impact. Id. at 2058-59.
140

Id.
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force their deceptive trade practice laws against any airline that deceptively advertises its rates, routes, or
services."' 4 1 While there is not currently a bill in Congress to provide for amendment of the ADA, Representative Charles E. Shumer of New York introduced a bill on
May 7, 1992 to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act
in order to provide for regulation of air carrier advertisements by the FTC.142 The bill, entitled the Airfare Advertising Reform Act of 1992, specifically incorporates
requirements for "clear and conspicuous" disclosure of
material restrictions, the inclusion of taxes, fees, fuel and
other surcharges, and advertisement of a round-trip fare
43
price if the fare requires a round-trip ticket purchase.
IV.
A.

THE FUTURE OF AIRLINE ADVERTISING
REGULATION
AGREEING ON DECEPTIVE AIRFARE ADVERTISING
PRACTICES

While the Supreme Court's decision established the
DOT's current position as the sole regulator of airline advertising, the decision does nothing to alleviate the consumer dissatisfaction with airfare advertisements and the
DOT's regulation of those advertisements. The DOT's
sole argument for maintaining severe limits on regulation
NAAG FavorsAirline Act Amendment on State Regulation of Deceptive Ads, 63 Arri& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 1574, at 81 (July 16, 1992). On July 10,
1992, Attorneys General Daniel E. Lungren of California, Robert T. Stephan of
Kansas, Hubert H. Humphrey, III, of Minnesota, William L. Webster of Missouri,
Robert Abrams of New York, Dan Morales of Texas, and Kenneth 0. Eikenberry
of Washington submitted the resolution to Congress. Id.; see also Claudia Maclachlan, AGs to Press Multistate Drive; Despite Air Fare Defeat, NAT'L L.J., June 15,
1992, at 3 (" 'Unless Congress decides otherwise, we are out of the consumer
protection area as far as airline rate advertising goes,' said Tennessee Attorney
General Charles W. Burnson, chairman of NAAG's consumer protection
taskforce.").
142 H.R. 5124, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Other Representatives have subsequently become co-sponsors of the bill. They are Representative Hyde of Illinois and Representative Owens of New York, joining on June 10, 1992, and
Representative Scherer of New York and Representative Machtley of Rhode Island, joining on July 1, 1992.
143 Id. § 3.
141

TRUST
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is based on its duty to preserve competition in the air
44
transportation industry to the greatest extent possible.'
This position has a significant affect on the DOT's approach to protecting consumers and other airlines from
unfair and deceptive trade practices such as misleading
airfare advertising. 45 A large part of the DOT's determination of whether an airfare advertisement is deceptive
hinges on whether a finding of deception and a corrective
regulation will be a potential impediment to price competition among the airlines.' 46 From past experience, the
DOT appears unwilling to rethink its position.
While price competition clearly plays a role in whether
consumers have access to low airfares, the DOT seems to
neglect the actual issue in policing advertising: if a particular advertising practice misleads or deceives consumers.
Other advertisement regulators on the federal, state, and
local government level are concerned first and foremost
with whether the advertisement conveys accurate information. 47 The DOT, on the other hand, seems to advocate
that consumers put up with misleading or confusing advertisements in the interest of protecting the current level
4
of competition in the air transportation industry.1 8
The DOT should approach the suggestions for changes
to the current regulatory scheme by first considering the
advertisements. Once an airline decides to advertise a
fare, the advertisement should, at a minimum, convey
what the airline is actually offering. Preventing unfair and
deceptive advertising practices is an important goal, separate from preserving price competition. Nevertheless,
through either increased efforts by the DOT or concurrent regulation by the DOT and the state attorneys general, it is possible to protect consumers from deceptive
144 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-12, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct.
2031 (1992).
,45 49 U.S.C. App. § 1381 (Supp. 1992).
,46 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct.
2031.
,47 Air Transport:Airline Observer, supra note 66, at 41.
'48

Diamond, supra note 45, at DI.
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advertising and to preserve fare competition to the extent
that it exists under the current federal regulatory
49
scheme.
B.

PREVENTING MISLEADING FARE ADVERTISEMENTS
WHILE PRESERVING FARE COMPETITION

Consumers, the states, and consumer protection agencies share the DOT's interest in enabling the airlines to
charge the lowest fares possible. Those parties who want
to subject airfare advertisements to more rigorous standards do not want to affect either fares or restrictions on
those fares. Rather, they want to make sure that airlines
meet the consumers' minimum expectations and convey
to the consumer what they offer in the advertisement. For
example, if an airfare is subject to a round-trip purchase,
the round-trip cost of the ticket should be included in the
50
advertisement. 1
Under the suggested framework of regulations, however, airlines could continue to use fares as an instrument
of competition. While the fares quoted in airline advertisements would be higher, the price would reflect the actual cost of the ticket and competition would be preserved
as the round-trip fare disclosure requirement would be
applied uniformly to all airlines. Consumers would be
told directly what the airline had to sell and at what price.
Likewise, requiring that all airlines reveal the material
conditions that apply to a particular fare in uniformly defined "clear and conspicuous'' terms will only serve to
better inform the consumer and need not impair competition between the airlines.
Finally, if airlines choose to generate publicity by offering low fares to consumers through advertising, they
should have some seats available at the fare advertised. 15 1
The airlines should set aside a number of seats at the low
fare, no matter how small, and should include some indiNAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-8.
15oId. at s-10.
151 See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-9.
149
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cation of the seat availability in the advertisement. Most
consumers understand that low fares offered by airlines
are subject to some restrictions. An advertisement, how52
ever, should convey those restrictions to the consumer.
Airlines will still be able to compete fairly as they will all
be required to disclose information with greater accuracy.
Despite the fact that the airlines challenged the enforcement of state consumer protection laws, airlines have also
indicated a willingness to modify their fare advertising
practices so long as other airlines do. 53 Those forming
the NAAG Guideline Taskforce found that many "airlines
stated candidly that their advertising and marketing practices were dictated by the practices of their competition." 54 In fact, some airlines went so far as to object to
the DOT's lax regulatory policy.' 55 For example, a Southwest Airlines representative characterized current airfare
advertisements, which feature "fictitious one-way fares,"
as "inherently deceptive."'' 56 Noting that the reputations
of the national airlines are declining in the eyes of consumers, airline industry commentators claim that this reputation is hardly "enhanced by ads
that are confusing at
1 57
best, badly misleading at worst."'
While the airlines have defended their methods of fare
152
153

Id.
Id. at s-4.

154Weiner, supra note 46, at 25. "Some airlines said they would prefer not to
promote the each-way fares, but that competitive pressures are too great." Id.
Many commentators feel that the airlines are unlikely to change their advertising
practices voluntarily, citing the Iraqi conflict, during which many airplanes flew
close to empty and fuel costs doubled, as well as the already poor financial shape
of so many of the larger airlines, evidenced by the bankruptcies of Continental
Airlines, Air Midwest, Pan American World Airways, and Eastern Airlines. Cowan
& Gargan supra note 45, at Al.
15- Meier, supra note 39, at 49.
156 Id. at 48. There are defectors in the airline camp.
Southwest Airlines,
Northwest Airlines, and USAir have all voiced objections to current advertising
practices and the lax regulatory policy with regard to these practices. "The law
does not permit a shoe retailer to advertise the price of one shoe when that shoe
can only be purchased as part of a pair," noted Randall Malin, an executive of
USAir. "So why should (you) permit airlines to advertise a one-way fare when
one-way travel is not offered at that fare?" Poling, supra note 10, at 10.

,-1Meier, supra note 39, at 48.
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advertising as a "matter of survival" necessary to avoid
competitive disadvantages in the current regulatory landscape, 158 there is no evidence that these practices are a
necessary part of price competition or that requiring the
suggested changes in advertising would diminish that
competition. 59 Congress did not deregulate the air transportation industry solely to eliminate regulation. Congress sought to improve the efficiency, innovation,
consumer services, and rates of the airline industry. 60
Congress retained regulatory power to prevent unfair
and deceptive trade practices in order to facilitate fair
competition.' 6' Deceptive trade practices, such as misleading advertising, only subvert competition. 162 Ensuring that consumers receive accurate information from
advertisements should maximize fair competition as
"[f]airness in the marketplace ... depends in part on accurately informed consumer choice, and not caveat
emptor."' 63 Consumers would obviously benefit from
64
more accurate advertisements. 1
158Weiner, supra note 46, at 32.
'9 Flint, supra note 38, at 2.
160 Perfect Union?, supra note 108, at 846. "Although the Airline Deregulation
Act stressed the importance of markets and free competition, Congress sought to
establish efficient, not simply deregulated, markets and thus noted the importance
of controlling unfair and deceptive practices." Id. at 857.
161

Id.

NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-6. "[D]eceptive and misleading advertising does not enhance consumer welfare, it lessens it." Id. Eliminating misleading
advertising should further goals of protecting true competition as unfair advertising practices subvert competition. Id. "A bedrock assumption supporting the
model of perfect competition is that buyers have accurate and complete information concerning the purchases they are making." Id.
162

163 Fraser, supra note 74, at 562.
"The premise of the regulation of deceptive
advertising is that a fair system of free enterprise depends on the consumer's ability to make an informed choice among a variety of competing products in the
marketplace." Id. The enforcement policies of the DOT, like those of the FTC,
under the Reagan and Bush administrations will "jeopardize the efficient operation of the marketplace by undermining consumers' trust in the information they
receive." Id.
-6NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-6. Jennifer Lawrence, State Ad Rules Face
Showdown, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 28, 1988, at 4.
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1.' Preventing Excessive Regulation
At some point, regulation could become so excessive
that it would force airlines to eliminate national fare advertising. 65 Understandably, the DOT is fearful of the
possible effects of excessive regulation. 166 For example,
the DOT is very concerned that an advertising regulation
that disallows the separation of fare components will be
too burdensome for the airlines and will result in the
elimination of fare advertisements altogether. 67 The
DOT cites the fact that some markets have two or more
airports and, as a result, ticket prices in that market can
vary depending on the embarkation or destination points
for a particular flight. 68 To comply with the NAAG
Guidelines, however, would only require that such airline
advertisements identify the airport when quoting the fare,
a practice that many airlines have already used. Alternatively, it would not be too burdensome for the airlines to
"clearly and conspicuously" denote that in markets with
two or more airports fares may vary slightly.
The regulations that have been suggested to the DOT
and those regulations outlined in the NAAG Guidelines
are not intended to result in the elimination of fare advertising. In the interest of consumer protection, legislators
have seen a more significant need for local ordinances,
state laws, and even federal laws that restrict the very type
of advertising practices for which the airlines are currently
165 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Morales 11, 112 S. Ct. 632.
Studies have revealed that consumers have paid higher prices when advertising in
other areas has been subject to extensive regulations. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977); see also Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the
Price of Eyeglasses, 15J. LAw & EcON. 337 (1972). Airlines have explained that the
increasing amount of national "image" advertising is a result of the difficulty in
disclosing all of the pertinent conditions placed on fares. Id. However, this trend
in advertising is also explained by the airlines' desire to avoid fare advertising
based on their belief that the fare wars of the '80s played a large role in the many
airline bankruptcies. Jennifer Lawrence, State Ad Rules Face Showdown, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 28, 1988, at 3.
166 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct.

2031 (1992).
167 Id. at 10-11.
-6 NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-6.
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criticized. The DOT, on the other hand, seems to protect
1 69
the airlines at the expense of the individual consumer.
In light of the relatively slight risk of a chill on airline fare
competition, the DOT should consider invoking its authority to control unfair and deceptive trade practices to
prevent further consumer dissatisfaction.
2.

Ensuring Uniformity

While it does not seem that the regulatory changes suggested need diminish airfare competition, competition
could very likely be affected if regulations were not applied uniformly across the nation. Airlines would find it
overly burdensome to advertise fares nationwide without
a uniform regulatory policy. 70 If the states were to enforce their own consumer protection laws, a potential lack
of uniformity could arise at two levels. First, the federal
regulations and the NAAG Guidelines, representing state
consumer protection laws, differ significantly. Second, all
of the different state governments would be able to enforce their own advertising regulations. Under a system
of concurrent jurisdiction, the airlines could face the prospect of several varying regulations applying to the same
national advertising.
Concurrent jurisdiction, however, need not result in a
lack of uniform regulation. The DOT's substantive regulations would effectively become obsolete. As the DOT's
regulation of price advertising is considerably more lenient than state regulation pursuant to the NAAG Guidelines, airline industry compliance to the NAAG Guidelines
would require surpassing the federal standards.
The possibility of all fifty states enforcing their own
consumer protection laws is perhaps more problematic
for the prospect of uniform regulation. The NAAG
Guidelines, however, were drafted and approved specifically to address problems of uniformity.' 7' The attorneys
170

Meier, supra note 39, at 48.
14 C.F.R. §§ 380, 399 (1992).

17,

NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-3.

169
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general, cognizant of the difficulties that would arise from
different advertisement requirements, adopted the NAAG
72
Guidelines to prevent inconsistent state regulations.
The NAAG Guidelines established uniform national
standards, thus presenting the airline industry with "safe
harbors."'' 73 If states were able to regulate airline advertising pursuant to the NAAG Guidelines, the industry
could be assured that compliance with the NAAG Guidelines would protect them from state actions, notwithstanding inconsistencies between the laws of different
states. 74 There is always a slight risk that a maverick state
attorney general might choose to enforce a stricter state
advertising law, resulting in disparate regulation across
the nation and possibly precluding advertising in some
markets. 75 The overwhelming support for the NAAG
Guidelines, however, as well as the concerted efforts of
the state attorneys general to create the NAAG Guidelines
and to enforce state laws pursuant to those Guidelines,
thus far indicate that prosecutorial discretion will be
76
exercised.
Uniformity is in the interest of the states as well as in
the interest of the airlines. 77 States will be motivated to
cooperate fully with each other, pursuant to the NAAG
Guidelines, in order to prevent economic disparity in the
enforcement of the advertising regulations. A state will
not want to single-handedly shoulder the burden of enforcing regulations at odds with the rest of the country. 78
172
17-

Id.
Perfect Union?, supra note 108, at 842.

174Id. The NAAG Guidelines sought to "provide coordinated consumer protection that avoids the danger of a single state creating an uneven playing field."

NAAG Guidelines, supra note 18, at s-3.
175 Jennifer Lawrence, States Defend Airline Authority,

ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 13,
1989, at 87.
176 All but two state attorneys general, those of Utah and New Mexico, approved the NAAG Guidelines. Felix H. Kent, Growth of State Regulation, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 25, 1988, at 4.
177 Id.
178Perfect Union?, supra note 108, at 842. Unlike federal regulation of a national
industry, state regulation might result in those states that most actively enforce
the regulations incurring disproportionate costs of enforcement. A regulating
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Neither will a state want to preclude fare advertisements
in their market, thus depriving their consumers of the opportunity to take advantage of the fares.
C.

ALTERNATIVE REGULATIONS WARRANTED

The Supreme Court's determination that only the
DOT, at least presently, will regulate airline advertising
has a significant impact on the substance of airfare advertising practices. Airlines are able to continue their current fare advertising practices without regard to the
standards required by the NAAG Guidelines, standards to
which advertising in other areas is already held. Ultimately, it is in the DOT's best interest, as well as that of
the airlines, to consider the suggestions of those who advocate stricter regulations. Advertising low fares in large
bold print may initially attract the attention of consumers.
The practices may even lead some consumers to purchase
tickets at a higher price upon learning of the applicable
restrictions or lack of availability. Fare advertising, however, has taken its toll on consumers, and the DOT should
at least address the criticisms.
Furthermore, the DOT should not continue to support
the current advertising practices in the interest of furthering competition. The great majority of the practices that
consumers want to stop have no real bearing on competition. For example, advertising one-way fare costs when a
round-trip purchase is required or putting restrictions in
print so small that consumers have difficulty reading them
are only efforts to attract consumers to a service that does
not really exist. The DOT should consider the real effects
that these and other advertising practices have on competition and work with the consumers and the airlines to determine the best possible requirements for disclosure to
give the consumer accurate and complete information.
The DOT should not automatically dismiss any potential
state "might suffer the focused wrath of the advertising and travel industries." Id.
States will want to act together and share the costs of enforcement to best serve
their citizens. Id.
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regulation based on a chilling effect to competition, but
should work with the states, consumers, and airlines.
V. CONCLUSION
The DOT has exclusive authority to regulate national
airline advertising. The Supreme Court, by deciding that
the DOT is the sole regulatory agent of airline advertising, has effectively eliminated the possibility for state attorneys general to exercise concurrent regulatory
authority at this time.179 Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's decision on this jurisdictional issue, the question
remains as to whether certain national airline advertising
practices are deceptive to consumers.
While the DOT claims commitment to protecting consumers from misleading and deceptive airfare advertisements,18 0 consumers, through their state and local
governments and consumer protection organizations,
contend that the protection offered by the DOT is not sufficient to ensure accurate advertising. The DOT's commitment to preserving competition within the air
transportation industry, a commitment that the DOT
claims that its critics do not share, strongly influences the
DOT's determination as to whether an airline advertising
practice is deceptive or misleading to consumers. Consumers argue that this determination should not depend
so heavily on whether requiring accurate advertising
might have an impact on industry competition. Rather, a
judgment as to the accuracy or deception of an advertisement should look to factors such as whether the advertisement accurately portrays the actual fare, the fare
availability, and the material conditions attached to that
fare.
Excessive regulation or regulations that are not uniformly applied nationwide could stall airfare competition.
Suggested alternative federal regulations and those reguSee supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
's0 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Morales IV, 112 S. Ct.
2031 (1992).
19
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lations that comprise the NAAG Guidelines, however,
seem neither to pose any significant problems with uniform application nor to be excessive. The DOT, while
continuing to work to preserve competition, can also work
to alleviate the dissatisfaction of consumers who have
been unhappy with airfare advertisements that are misleading. As the DOT, however, seems unwilling to
change its position, Congress should take legislative action to specifically eliminate the DOT's current preemption, forcing concurrent federal and state regulation, or
otherwise insure that federal regulation adequately protects consumers.

